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Опубликовано: 15 Октябрь 2022
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Uitgezette Russen deden in Nederland aan contraspionage en espionage hightech-sector
Eelco Bosch van Rosenthal (Nieuwsuur reporter) Ben Meindertsma (onderzoeksredactie)
De zeventien Russische inlichtingenofficieren die Nederland eind maart uitzette, hielden zich onder andere bezig met het versleutelen van geheime berichten, counterspionage en het mellen van informatie over computerchips voor het Russische leger. That's the result of an investigation by NOS en Nieuwsuur in collaboration with the Belgische krant De Tijd .
Acht van hen werkten voor de Russische buitenlandse inlichtingendienst SVR, negen voor de militaire inlichtingendienst GRU. De mannen deden zich voor als handelsvertegenwoordiger in Amsterdam, military attaché of diplomat at the OPCW, de Organisatie voor het Banbod op Chemische Wapens in Den Haag. Over hun identiteit en hun bezigheden in Nederland was tot nu toe niets bekend.
Decennialang werkten voor de GRU en SVR (een van de followers van de KGB) zo'n twintig Russische spionnen in Nederland als official cover: een spion die zich voordoet als diplomatat. It was about half of the higher embassy personnel. Geen enkel ander land deed dat op die schaal.
Dat de Russische inlichtingenofficieren zich vrij in Nederland konden bewegen was al die jaren bekend bij de Nederlandse inlichtingendiensten AIVD en MIVD die er na een visumaanvraag vaak snel achter kwamen dat het om een spion ging. In de wetenschas dat Moskou op een uitzetting zou regiben door zelf een Nederlandse diplomatat uit te zetten, werd de presence van Russische spionnen in Nederland jarenlang door het ministerie van Buitenlandes Zaken gedoog.
Dit weten we over de Russische spionnen in Nederland
Daar kwam abrupt een einde aan toen Rusland gegende februari Ukraine binnenviel. In consultation with the AIVD and the MIVD in other European countries, the ministerie van Buitenlandes Zaken eind maart het gros van de Russische spionnen uit te zetten. Ook andere Europese landen deden dat. A total of 200 spionnen vertrekken were needed.
Referentura
Boven aan de Nederlandse lijst stond de 52-jarige Sergey Pyatnitskiy, zeggen inlichtingenbronnen. Zijn uitzetting had bij de diensten priority omdat hij aan het hoofd stond van de encryptiedienst op de Haagse ambassade. On the embassy grounds, the Russian intelligence services each have their own designated referentura , a camera from which secret communication with Moscow takes place.
Uitzetting van de encryptionie-experts - zes in total in Nederland - gold als priority voor alle westerse landen, die NATO-geheimen en informatie over wapenleverantie aan Ukraine per se uit Russische handen wilden houden. Also de Russen zien de encryptionie-experts als essential. Volgens inlichtingenbronnen mochten de zes alleen onder strenge geschäften het ambassadeterrein veralten, om te voorkommen dat ze zowenen overlopen.
De overige elf spionnen had alle alle als taak om aktif inlichtingen te mellenen te mellenen te interessantes personen in kaart te bringen. Twee uitgezette spionnen werkten voor Directorateaat VRK , de afdeling van de SVR in Moskou die zich focus op counterspionage. Zij waren belast met het werven van bronnen onder Nederlands inlichtingenpersoneel, en bij buitenlandse diensten die in Nederland actief zijn, zoals de Amerikaskan inlichtingendienst CIA. In addition, moest het tweetal het overige ambassadepersoneel in de gaten houden, om zeker te weten dat niemand in contact zou treden met Nederlandse inlichtingendiensten.
Zeker twee andere uitgezette inlichtingenofficieren hebben expertise op het gebeid van militaire technologie. Inlichtingenbronnen gaan ervan uit dat zij onder andere in Nederland waren om informatie about computerchips voor het Russische leger te mellen. The Netherlands is known worldwide as an important player in the development of computer chips. Twee jaar geleden werd er ook al een Russische inlichtingenofficier uitgezet die hier in de ogen van Nederland te actief mee bezig was.
De Russische inlichtingenofficieren gebruikten verslichkeit dekmantels. Drie van hen kwamen Nederland binnen als lid van de Russische delegatie bij de Organisatie voor het Banbod op Chemische Wapens in Den Haag. They showed themselves echter selden of nooit. Four GRU officers worked as handelsattaché from the kleine Russische handelsvertegenwoording aan het Museumplein in Amsterdam. Een van hen was het adjunct-hoofd van de präsenting.
Ben de Jong, an expert in the field of Russian intelligence and connected to the University of Leiden, thinks that the Russians are not looking for Dutch information per se. Zaken of Defensie, dan heb je een goede kans dat ze op die manier ook achter geheimen weten komen die door andere landen of organizations met Nederland worden geeld. Op die manier fungeert Nederland als een achterdeur."
Eerder liet Nederland al weten dat het drie spionnen heeft leten zitten. It appears that the head of the GRU and the SVR at the Hague embassy, and the SVR officer responsible for the security of the embassy personnel. The Netherlands wants the lines with the Russian services openhouden voor noodgevallen, for example in het geval van terroristische threatsingen.
In a joint response, the AIVD and the MIVD are not in op de seventien namen en funktions. Wel gehenten de diensten dat de mannen al veel langer in de gaten werden werden geheiten. "De opstelling van Rusland en de steun die Nederland uitsprak voor Ukraine, maakte de presence van deze groep in Nederland extra ongewenst."
Voor dit onderzoek spoke the onderzoekredactie van NOS en Nieuwsuur and the Belgische krant De Tijd with zes current and former sources of information in the Netherlands and Belgium, with a number of diplomatic sources and with a person who in the past worked on one of the Russian representatives in the Netherlands . The findings were presented to a number of analysts, including Ben de Jong, onderzoeger van inlichtingendiensten aan de Universiteit Leiden, and Mark Galeotti, expert in Russian services and connected to the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) in London. Het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken wilde niet regigen. De Russische embassade is meerder malen om een geversok begward, maar is ultimatum niet op dat zroekt ingegaan.
"For decades, about twenty Russian spies in the Netherlands worked for the GRU and SVR as an official cover"
Deported Russians engaged in counter-espionage and espionage in the high-tech sector in the Netherlands
Eelco Bosch van Rosenthal reporter News Hour; Ben Meindertsma research editor
The seventeen Russian intelligence officers who were expelled from the Netherlands at the end of March were involved in, among other things, encrypting secret messages, counter-espionage and collecting information about computer chips for the Russian army. This is apparent from research by the NOS and Nieuwsuur in collaboration with the Belgian newspaper De Tijd .
Eight of them worked for the Russian foreign intelligence service SVR, nine for the military intelligence service GRU. The men posed as trade representatives in Amsterdam, military attaché or diplomat at the OPCW, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. Until now, nothing was known about their identity and their activities in the Netherlands.
For decades, about twenty Russian spies in the Netherlands worked for the GRU and SVR (one of the successors to the KGB) as an official cover: a spy posing as a diplomat. It was about half the senior embassy staff. No other country has done it on that scale.
All those years, the Dutch intelligence services AIVD and MIVD knew that the Russian intelligence officers could move freely in the Netherlands, which often quickly found out after a visa application that it was a spy. Knowing that Moscow would respond to an expulsion by expelling a Dutch diplomat itself, the presence of Russian spies in the Netherlands was tolerated for years by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This is what we know about the Russian spies in the Netherlands
That came to an abrupt end when Russia invaded Ukraine last February. After consultation with the AIVD and MIVD and other European countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided at the end of March to deport most of the Russian spies. Other European countries did the same. In total, more than 200 spies had to leave.
Reference
At the top of the Dutch list was 52-year-old Sergey Pyatnitskiy, intelligence sources say. His deportation was a priority for the services because he was in charge of the encryption service at the Hague embassy. On the embassy grounds, the Russian intelligence services each have their own so-called referentura , a room from which secret encrypted communication with Moscow takes place.
Expulsion of the encryption experts - six in total in the Netherlands - was a priority for all Western countries, which insisted on keeping NATO secrets and information about arms supplies to Ukraine out of Russian hands. The Russians also see the encryption experts as essential. According to intelligence sources, the six were only allowed to leave the embassy grounds under strict supervision to prevent them from overflowing.
The remaining eleven spies were all tasked with actively gathering intelligence or identifying individuals of interest. Two expelled spies were working for the RRK Directorate , the SVR's branch in Moscow that focuses on counterintelligence. They were charged with recruiting sources from Dutch intelligence personnel and from foreign services active in the Netherlands, such as the American intelligence service CIA. In addition, the two had to keep an eye on the other embassy personnel, to make sure that no one would come into contact with Dutch intelligence services.
At least two other deported intelligence officers have military technology expertise. Intelligence sources assume that they were in the Netherlands, among other things, to collect information about computer chips for the Russian army. The Netherlands is known worldwide as an important player in the development of computer chips. Two years ago, a Russian intelligence officer was also deported who, in the eyes of the Netherlands, was too actively involved in this.
The Russian intelligence officers used different cover-ups. Three of them entered the Netherlands as members of the Russian delegation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. However, they rarely, if ever, showed up there. Four GRU officers worked as a commercial attaché from the small Russian trade representation on the Museumplein in Amsterdam. One of them was the Deputy Head of Representation.
Ben de Jong, an expert in the field of Russian intelligence services and affiliated with Leiden University, thinks that the deported Russians were not necessarily looking for Dutch information: "If a Russian service succeeds here in recruiting someone from Foreign Affairs or Defense, then you have a good chance that they will also find out secrets that are shared with the Netherlands by other countries or organizations. In this way, the Netherlands acts as a back door."
The Netherlands previously announced that it had left three spies behind. It turns out to be the heads of the GRU and the SVR at the embassy in The Hague, and an SVR officer who is responsible, among other things, for the safety of the embassy staff. The Netherlands wants to keep lines open with the Russian services in the event of emergencies, for example in the event of terrorist threats.
In a joint response, the AIVD and the MIVD do not discuss the seventeen names and positions. The services do confirm that the men had been monitored for much longer. "The attitude of Russia and the support that the Netherlands expressed for Ukraine made the presence of this group in the Netherlands extra undesirable."
For this investigation, the investigative editors of NOS and Nieuwsuur and the Belgian newspaper De Tijd spoke with six current and former intelligence sources in the Netherlands and Belgium, with a number of diplomatic sources and with a person who worked in the past at one of the Russian representations in the Netherlands. . The findings were presented to a number of analysts, including Ben de Jong, an intelligence researcher at Leiden University, and Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russian services and affiliated with the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) in London. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to comment. The Russian embassy was asked several times for an interview, but in the end did not accede to that request.
